


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FREE THOUGHTS

ON THE LATE

Treaty of Alliance

CONCLUDED AT

W. O. R. M. S.

BY A

Member of Parliament,

IN A

LETTER

To his *Friend* in the *Country*.

L O N D O N:

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Free Thoughts

ON THE

Late TREATY of Alliance

CONCLUDED AT

W O R M S.

S I R,

IT is the Misfortune of our Nation to be thought better *Soldiers* than *Statesmen*, which, tho' a Compliment to our Bravery, is none at all to our Policy, but rather a tacit Arraignment of *English* Understanding; and I wish it may be this only which is intended by Foreign-

ers in their Charge against us as *Negotiators*. I am afraid the *Innuendo* is stronger against *English Integrity* than *English Understanding*, it being notorious, that those very Foreigners who suggest thus disadvantageously of us as *Treaty-makers*, admit our Erudition and Knowledge in all Arts and Sciences to equal at least, if not exceed that of any Nation in *Europe*.

It is pretty near equal to the Community whether the national *Interest* be sacrificed thro' *Avarice* or *Folly*; but as there is, or ought to be, such a Thing as *National Honour*, which it is the Interest and Duty of each Individual to maintain, I confess I should rather our Statesmen were deem'd *Fools* than *Knäves*. A Deprivation of Sense, being a natural Imperfection, is a Misfortune, but no *Crime*; unless it be attended with an over-bearing *Vanity* of assuming an unsuitable Character, and passing for, and appearing what Nature never design'd: But 'tis quite otherwise with *Dishonesty*; which is an *Act* of the Will, a Vice acquir'd, and the most detestable of any, because none is, or can be so injurious to Society.

But in whatever Light our *Negotiators* appear to Foreigners, whether as *Fools* or *Knäves*, or both, it is but too true that the Nation has essentially suffer'd by the *Opinion*

nion they conceive of being able to over-reach, or bribe them out of their *Integrity*. For it is in *Negotiation* as in *Fighting*; he who entertains a strong Opinion of his own *Influence* and *Abilities*, and a disadvantageous one of both the *Sense* and *Honesty* of him he treats with, has undoubtedly the Odds on his Side, and must necessarily succeed in his Views upon him; unless, as on Occasion of the late memorable *Convention* with *Spain*, the Spirit of the Nation exert itself, and prevails over all *Self-sufficiency* and *Art* on one Side, and *Weakness* and *Corruption* on the other.

In the late Administration, wherein the Science of *Negotiation* was never less understood, tho' never more practis'd by this Nation, our *Negotiators* abroad, one or two clumsy, awkward, and heavy *Plenipoes* excepted, were really Men of good plain Understanding, some of them above the common Level, and all of them of such Parts and Knowledge as might guard them sufficiently against being over-reach'd or surpriz'd: Yet, if there be any Truth or Reality in the late *Opposition*, nay if our present *Negotiators* themselves may be credited, there was neither Connexion or Sense, much less Honesty, or any View to either the inmediate or immeditate Interests of these Nations, in any or all our Treaties, during
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the late Minister's Influence. That *Great Man*, in his Turn, if I am not mistaken, said the same thing of the Earl of Sunderland's Administration, which he oppos'd ; from whence, if *Great Men* are not F---ls out, and K---s in Power, it may be concluded, that we have had nothing like a good, a sensible, or advantageous *Treaty*, from the Acceffion to the *Fall*, if falling on a Bed of *Court-down* may be deem'd *Falling*, of the late Minister.

If, then, our *Negotiators* during that whole Period, *H-----* and *I---c* excepted, had Sense enough to know the *Interest* of their Country, and Knowledge enough to direct them to a true Pursuit of that *Interest*, it follows, that there must be another Cause than the Imbecillity of our *Negotiators*, for the Badness of our *Negotiations*. I am very loth to impute these publick Misfortunes to any Cause that might reflect Dishonour on the Frobity of many of those Gentlemen who negotiated for us, for many of whom I have a personal Esteem, as knowing them to be, in private Life, Men of great Honour and Integrity : But the Fault must lie somewhere. *Treaties* are Transactions of Moment, and tho' frequently negotiated with Secrecy, are yet weigh'd and consider'd with the utmost Deliberation. A *Plenipo* cannot, dare not, move

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an Inch without Orders from his Court ; unless, which seldom happens, he has a discretionary Power. On this Supposition, then, which I think not at all unnatural, the *Negotiators* of *iniquitous Treaties*, tho' highly blameable for acting against the Interest of their Country out of venal Considerations, *Dread*, or Complaisance, are not so culpable as their *Directors*, or rather *Director* ; for in the Cabinet of most Princes there is generally an *Individual*, who is charg'd with, or takes upon him the Direction of foreign Affairs.

It happens sometimes, and but rarely, that the *Director* in the Cabinet becomes the *Negotiator* abroad ; and, in such Instances, the Publick generally look for some uncommon, extraordinary Issue from the Negotiation. They conclude, that as he has the principal Direction of these Matters, whilst he is at home, he must necessarily be arm'd with discretionary Power when he takes upon himself the Office of a *Plenipo.* The late Minister often dispatch'd that polite Statesman, his Brother, to negotiate for the Nation ; but had he deign'd, in Person, to have gone of those national Errands, how had the publick Expectation been rais'd ?

But that cunning Statesman, sensible of the Ascendant Foreigners have of us in
Nego-

Negotiation, conscious of his own Inability, or loth to move out of the Orb of the *Treasury*, he never ventur'd, tho' supposed to sway more than any Minister we have had since the *Reformation*, to negotiate personally abroad, or singly at home: Perhaps he did not care to take the Blame singly upon himself; or perhaps, self-sufficient as he was, he was not so presumptuous as to think he ought to trust to his own Parts, and rely on his single Capacity, without Colleagues, in Negotiations of Importance. But whatever were his Reasons, 'tis certain he went not abroad to negotiate, nor concluded any Treaty at home without Colleagues. His Advocates, in Print, and he himself in full Senate, made use of this Argument to get rid of the Infamy of the Treaty of *Hanover*; but such an Excuse, wretched as it is, is more than another *Premier* can make for another *German* Treaty, should the Publick ever dislike and condemn it as much as the other.

To consider these Treaties, negotiated under the Eye of our Sovereign in *Germany*, a Land fertile in Expedients for the Interests of this happy Nation, upon the general Scope of them, they are similar in some things, tho' nominally different in others, and widely so in many Essentials.

The Treaty of *Hanover* was a *defensive* Alliance, so is that of *Worms*; thiere were but *three* original Contractors to the first, there are no more to the second: That of *Hanover* was negotiated by a single *Plenipo* from each Royal Contractor, so was that of *Worms*. Our *Plenipo* at *Hanover* was a Secretary of State, and almost a *Premier*; but, for the Happiness of his Country, the *Plenipo* at *Worms* was not only a principal *S---y* like the other, but a *Premier* without a Competitor, at least at the time of this Negotiation. The Similitude is so strong, that it happens the Treaties were sign'd in the same Month of the Year, and within one on the same Day of the Month. That of *Hanover* is dated the 2d of *September*, this of *Worms* on the 3d in the same Month; as if our consummate *Negotiator* at the latter had been emulous of treading in the Steps of the former in the minutest Circumstances.

Considering this Emulation, I have wonder'd to find the Preambles of both Treaties worded differently. That of *Hanover* begins, *Sans façon*, " Their Majesties the " King of *Great Britain*, the most Chri- " stian King, and the King of *Prussia*, " having, with Pleasure, observ'd how " much the *strict Union* subsisting between " them has contributed not only to the *Hap-*

"*piness of their own Kingdoms and Subjects, but also to the publick Good and Tranquillity, &c.*"--- One cannot help observing, on this Occasion, how differently Princes think from the Vulgar, and how different their Sensations. Here it is said, that the three Royal Contractors having observed, with *Pleasure*, the publick and general *Happiness resulting from their Union, &c.*---I can't take upon me to say what Degree of *Happiness* resulted from the Union, to the Subjects of their *Christian* and *Prussian* Majesties; but sure I am, that none of his late *Britannick* Majesty's Subjects, except *Placemen* and *Pensioners*, imagin'd that any *Happiness* or *Good* resulted to these Nations from that boasted *Union*. Pray Heaven they may not have Cause for imagining the like from the *Union* cemented by this triple Alliance concluded at *Worms*! I am sure the *Prognostics* are not more favourable to this Nation now, than when the *Hanover* *Union* was cemented. —— But to the Subject of the Preambles.

I have transcribed the Beginning of that of the Treaty of *Hanover*, in order to place our late Negotiator in his proper Light. This great, this orthodox, this religious Statesman, has recourse to supernatural Aid in all his Negotiations.

Mind.

Mind his Piety and Solemnty in the Preamble to a Treaty, where the *Rights* of a Party, no Contractor, seems to have been transferr'd from him without either his Privity or Consent. Thus begins the 'Treaty of Worms, *In the Name of the most holy Trinity, &c.*' — I remember a certain rich late City Knight and Alderman being asked, how he came to accumulate so great Wealth? answered pithily, *By never dealing with a Man who pretended to more Piety than his Neighbours.* The Citizen suppos'd, without doubt, that such Pretenders were Hypocrites, which indeed should be shun'd by Mankind, as being the Pest of Society. But I must do the Justice to our Negotiator at *Worms*, to say, tho' he sets out more piously, or in the aforesaid Knight's Apprehension, more hypocritically, than his Predecessor at *Hanover*, that he is the farthest from being a Hypocrite of any Man in the Nation. He never minces the Matter, but plainly tells the Publick, that a War and Expence being necessary, they must be contented with both, whether they will or no; and that in consequence of this so necessary a Resolution, they shall have certain foreign *Mercenaries*, whether they like them or not. In short, I revere the Man for being above board, and speaking plainer

either in Publick or over his Bottle, than any Minister I remember.

There is, however, no general Rule without an Exception; and for this Reason, let his publick and private Professions and Speeches during his *Opposition* to the late Minister, be forgot and excused. I am speaking of actual Ministers; not of those who *would be such*. Men for the most part may be considered as Creatures altering their Nature and becoming of another Species, when they retire from the Community to shine in the Court Circle, by promoting and increasing the Influence of the Prince.

Some Casuists are of Opinion, that a Man *may do Evil that Good may come of it*: If this Axiom be teneable, our *Plenipo* has nothing in the World to do, but to own that he opposed the late Minister, and professed himself a P—t in the sense of the pur-blind Herd, in order to have it in his Power to do those mighty *good Things* for the Nation which he has done since he has been honoured with the Royal Confidence. Is not this an ample Solution of all Difficulties arising from the Difference of his Professions and Actions

The Visibility of the many *good Things* that have been done for us, since this Gentleman prevailed, is too certain to be controverted.

troverted. The late Minister was for aggrandizing the beloved *Electorate* by Part of the *Prussian* Dominions contiguous to it; but the Squeamishness of the Queen of *Hungary* put an End to that Project, which was the only I can think of most likely to satiate the *H——n* Ambition, without burthening *G. B.* But however seemingly advantageous that Scheme appeared to have been, as the Execution of it might be attended with some *Risque* to the *Electorate*, though at an *Expence* which is always to be born by the *British Milch Cow*, all Thoughts of Conquest and Enlargement were changed by our present *Primier*, into the less dangerous Expedients of mutual *Guaranties*. By this Means *Britain* is happily become Guaranty for the *Prussian* Possession of *Silesia*, which very probably will procure us the Honour of displaying our Banners on the Frontiers of *Poland*; whenever we shall be so fortunate as to raise the House of *Austria* to its primitive Greatness.

I could name many other *good Things*, which have been done for this happy Nation, and happened to us since the late Ministerial Change; But, Sir, need I enumerate Benefits felt and admitted by the whole Nation? Is there a Man without Place or Pension, or Expectation of either in

in the Kingdom, but feels he is the richer for the Encrease of the Current Expence, from *four* to *seven* or *eight millions*? Is there one that is not pleased with the Discipline, Conduct and Gallantry of our *Mercenaries* last Campaign, or that thinks the Success at *Dettingen* might have been better improved, if there had not been some *Electoral* Reasons in the Way, or a Design of prolonging the War? Is there one who thinks the Queen of *Hungary*, and we of course, should be contented with the Offers of *France* and the Emperor after the Evacuation of *Bohemia* and *Bavaria* by the *French*? or that would not, like *Totten* in the late Reign, give the whole twenty Shillings, rather than wrestle with *France* for Provinces which we were unable, and never designed to force from her? But why recur we to past Benefits, when one more recent is in view?

The Treaty of *Worms*, Sir, is of those *good Things* I mentioned to have been done for this Nation, since the late Ministry. 'Tis not *Good* only, but *superlatively* so, as I shall endeavour to shew from some few cursory Observations upon it, which I beg leave to trouble you with.

You must know, that I don't greatly approve of concluding Alliances of great Importance, in the manner and place this

Treaty

Treaty was concluded, being of Opinion, that Matters of this Moment should be transacted with the utmost Deliberation and Caution, which can never be by a single Negotiator, and in the Hurry of Marches, Councils of War, and other bustling Concomitants of a Campaign. But waving this general Objection, I cannot see the Propriety or Policy of supposing, nay actually of calling a Prince an *Enemy*, who, whatever may be his Inclinations, has in no shape appeared an *Enemy* to the Royal Contractors hitherto ; and farther, who has actually entered into a Treaty of *Neutrality* with us.

In the Preamble to this Treaty it is said, " That the Danger of the Ballance in *Europe*, its Liberties and Commerce, are still increas'd by the Conquest which the *Kings of Spain and Naples* have openly undertaken to make of the Dominions possess'd by the most Serene *House of Austria* in *Italy*." — And again, a little lower, it is said, " That the Contractors unite especially for the Sake of repelling, with one Accord, the unjust Invasions made by the *Kings of Spain and Naples, &c.*"

I pass over the Impropriety of calling the Monarch of the *Sicilies* King of *Naples*; but where is the Prudence of declar-
ng,

ing, in a solemn Treaty, a Prince to be an *Enemy*, who has given no Cause for the Appellation? Where is the Decency and Politeness towards a crown'd Head? Where appears the Candour of solemnizing an Unt---h, if it be one, as it appears to us, who, tho' no Ministers, are not however without Curiosity and Observation?

The Decorum us'd by the Negotiators at *Hanover* was more polite and genteel; for tho' the late *Emperor* and King of *Spain* were the immediate Objects of that Alliance, yet are they not so much as once named in the Treaty. But this polite Tour of Address may be imputed to the *Sçavoir vivre* of the *French* Nation, of whom there was one a Negotiator of that Treaty.

I am tempted to transcribe an Article of this *Hanover* Treaty, tho' seemingly foreign to my present Purpose, to point out to you the far greater *Delicacy* with which the *Interest* of the *Electorate* was consider'd in those early Days than the present, when Habit and Custom have render'd Things familiar and easy.

Far from presuming by that Treaty to dispose of *Rights* and *Possessions*, belonging to neutral and inoffensive Powers; far from saddling this Nation with the Discharge of a *Mortgage* of near *half a Million*, as a

Com-

Compensation for stripping such Powers of their Possessions, without Consent ; far, I say, from doing any thing so gross and flagrant, we find the *Hanover* Negotiators securing the *Electorate* and its Acquisitions, with the gentlest Side-breeze and Delicacy of Expression that could be invented.

ARTICLE the Vth of the Treaty of Hanover in 1725.

“ His most Christian Majesty being particularly interested as Guarantee of the Treaties of *Westphalia*, in the maintaining of the Privileges of the *Germanick* Body ; and their *Britannick* and *Prussian* Majesties, as Members of that Body, observing with equal Concern, Seeds of Division and of Complaint that may at length break out, and bring on a War, which, by fatal Consequences resulting from it, might set all *Europe* on Fire ; their said Majesties being ever attentive to what may one Day disturb the Tranquillity of the Empire in particular, and that of *Europe* in general, do engage and promise to help each other mutually in maintaining and causing to be observed the aforesaid Treaties, and other Acts which have settled the Affairs of the Empire, &c.”

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Besides

Besides this fine distant Stroke in favour of the *Electorate*, under a Pretence of maintaining the Peace of the Empire in general, and the Treaties of *Westphalia*, that is, of *Munster* and *Osnabrug*; to which, by the Bye, the Kings of *Great Britain* were no Parties, and consequently this Crown unconcern'd in the Execution or Infraction of them; there is a general *Guaranty* by the second Article, which includes *Hanover* effectually. So that you can't but observe how tenderly and delicately, tho' effectually, the *Electorate* was secur'd in the late Reign, by a Treaty solely calculated for its Meridian; tho' our Court pretended it was to secure the general *Tranquillity*. Nor can it escape you, that the late *Emperor*, tho' at that time dreaded by *Hanover*, is not so much as named or hinted at, in a Treaty purely enter'd into to reduce his Power.

Here, my Friend, was Art and Address; here was Prudence, Policy, and Decency; tho' the Interest of the *British* Pack-horse was as little consulted in those Days as the present. But in the present Treaty, the Mention made of the *Sicilian* Monarch as an *Enemy*, shews that our Negotiators treated in the *Field*, a *German Field*, where probably *Insult* and *Roughness* pass for Politeness and Address.

Tho'

Tho', in all Likelihood, we shall have this Treaty canvass'd where I shall be at Liberty to speak my Mind more freely than I can at present; yet, as you desire to have my Opinion of it, I shall most willingly gratify you, wishing I could write to you with as much Safety to my Bookseller, as I may to myself, when I take Share in the Debate concerning this national Compact.

After the Preamble, which has nothing material or uncommon in it, but the *Blunder*, if it may be call'd by so gentle a Name, concerning the *King of Naples*, hinted at before, there is an Insertion of the *Provisional Convention* between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Turin* in 1742, which you may expect to indulge your Curiosity, by way of Appendix. This Convention is inserted on a Supposition, I fancy, that it may be look'd upon a proper Basis for the present Treaty: But to speak freely, I think the Treaty would be more uniform, plain, and intelligible, and consequently better without it. But here it is, tho' it might as well be any where else; and you are welcome to it, provided you expect no other Observation upon it, from me, but this, That there is not the least Mention made in it of *Final, Subsidy, or Territory* to be given to his *Sardinian* Majesty; tho' the

Queen of *Hungary* was then in a much worse Plight, and wanted his Alliance much more, than when every Thing was conceded to him at *Worms*. But you are to remember, that that Convention was negotiated solely by Ministers from the Princes immediately concern'd ; and that the Treaty of *Worms* had the Advantage of being negotiated chiefly by the Subject of a Nation grown ridiculous all over *Europe* of late Years, for being no less lavish of her own *Treasures*, and indifferent to her own *Interests* than those of her best Friends.

The Queen of *Hungary* might very justly suppose she was under no Necessity of purchasing the Friendship of a Prince, whose Interest was deeply engag'd in maintaining Peace and an *Equilibrium* in *Italy*. She was persuaded, as all the World ought, that his *Sardinian* Majesty had as much Reason to dread an Increase of the Power of the House of *Bourbon* in *Italy* as she, and rather more ; because that House might conquer and dictate in *Italy*, yet she might be powerful and independent in *Germany*, *Hungary*, and in the rest of her hereditary Dominions ; but the Reverse must necessarily be the Fate of a Prince, whose Territories would be surrounded and wedg'd in by Princes of the *Bourbon* Family, should Don *Philip* force himself into the Possession

session of the *Austrian* Dominions in *Italy*.

This Consideration, no doubt, was the Reason that we see no flattering or fawning Condescension on the Side of her *Hungarian* Majesty throughout this whole *Convention*. On the contrary, you may see, that she ties down her Ally from asserting, pending the Alliance, even a chimerical Title form'd by some of his Ancestors on Part of her Dominions. — By the fourth Article of the *Convention*, the King of *Sardinia*, far from asserting any Title to the *Milanese*, stipulates, *That as long as the provisional Agreement shall last, he will not avail himself of his pretended Rights to the State of Milan, which are not enter'd into in this Treaty, forasmuch as the Queen of Hungary cannot admit them, &c.*

Had that Princefs a Dread, or even a Jealousy, that any Consideration offer'd by *Spain* could induce the King of *Sardinia* to warp so far from his immediate Interest, as to confederate against her, she had never insisted on the Insertion of such a Clause in the Instrument of Alliance: But she was too sensible of that Prince's Self-necessity to wave any Right, or Pretence of any, out of Deserence or Complaisance. This leads me to consider that Prince's Circumstances, and Capacity of defending himself, in Conjunction

junction with the Queen of *Hungary*, supposing we had been so wise and faithful to ourselves as to with-hold our over-bountiful Hands from filling his Purse and emptying our own.

You will observe, by the fifth Article of the *Triple Alliance* at *Worms*, what Force was judg'd necessary by the High Allies to be employ'd for the Preservation of *Italy*: But that my Observations on this Article may be the more intelligible to you, I will insert that Article and the preceding (the fourth) in this Place, tho' immethodical.

ARTICLE IV.

For this Purpose his Majesty the King of *Sardinia*, who has already join'd his Forces to those of the Queen of *Hungary*, and who has already considerably augmented them, shall continue to concert and execute jointly with her and her Generals, all the Measures and Operations which shall be judg'd the most effectual for keeping off and repelling the Invasion now made, or to be hereafter made, against the Dominions of the said Queen, and for securing them from all Danger, present and future, as much as possible.

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ARTICLE V.

In order to attain this End, and as long as the present War shall last, her Majesty the Queen of *Hungary* engages not only to keep in *Italy* the Number which she has there now, but to augment them to the Number of 30,000 effective Men, as soon as the Situation of Affairs in *Germany* will permit it. And his Majesty the King of *Sardinia* engages to keep and employ the Number of 40,000 Foot, and 5000 Horse, comprehending in it what will be necessary for the Garrisons, and Defence of his own Dominions.

The Sixth ARTICLE

Stipulates, that this Prince shall have the supreme Command, which is natural, because his *All*, his *very Being*, depends on the Rectitude of the Measures and Operations in the Field. But before I begin my promised Observations on the foregoing Fifth Article, it will be necessary that you see the Seventh and Eighth Articles, which gave rise to such thoughts as I shall subjoin.

ARTICLE VIIth.

As long as it shall be necessary, towards favouring and seconding those Operations, and

and as long as the Danger of the *Allies*, and of *Italy* shall demand it, his Majesty the King of *Great Britain* engages to keep in the *Mediterranean Sea*, a strong Squadron of Ships of War, and Bomb-Vessels, and Fire-Ships, the Admiral and Commander whereof shall have Orders to concert constantly and regularly with his Majesty the King of *Sardinia*, or with his Generals, and with those of her Majesty the Queen of *Hungary*, who shall be nearest at hand, the most proper Measures for the Service of the common Cause.

ARTICLE VIIIth.

Moreover, and in order to assist in the Bearing the extraordinary Expence which his Majesty the King of *Sardinia* is, and will be obliged to support, for raising and causing to act, a much greater Number of Troops, than his own Revenues can maintain, his Majesty the King of *Great Britain* engages to furnish him, for as long as the War and the Occasion for it shall continue, a Subsidy of *Two hundred thousand Pounds Sterl. per Annum*, to be paid every three Months, and to commence from the first of *February 1742*, N. S. being the Day upon which the Provisional Convention was signed between the said King and the

the Queen of *Hungary*; and the said Subsidy shall be punctually paid from three Months to three Months in Advance: Provided, however, that what shall have been advanced to his Majesty the King of *Sardinia*, before the Signature of the present Treaty, shall be reckoned into it.

You will perceive by the aforesaid Fourth Article, how effectually Self-interest and Self-preservation operated at the Court of *Turin*, by considering that before we granted the King of *Sardinia* a Subsidy, or engaged to keep a Fleet at his Service, he augmented his Forces, put him upon his Guard, and entered in a close defensive Alliance with the Queen of *Hungary*. This Caution was necessary, and it was natural: For Nature directs *Self-Interest*, and she is obey'd at all the Courts of *Europe* except *one*, where every Species of *Self-Interest* is understood and practised but the most laudable, the *Publick* and *Patrial*. In the fine Season of the Year, indeed, when this Court removes from the Seat of Empire, private *Self-Interest* subsides to make way for the *Publick*; but on these Occasions, this publick *Self-Interest* is confined to the worse part of the Prince's Dominions, and the most despicable and

unmeriting of his Subjects. —— But to our present Purpose.

By the Fifth Article, the Force supposed to be necessary for the Preservation of *Italy* is 75,000 Men, which, considering the Security of the *Alps* from the Power of *France* by Land, and our Commanding the Sea, is much more than is necessary, even supposing the King of the *Sicilies* should openly declare in favour of *Don Philip*. We will now examine if this Force may not be supported without any Subsidy from the Nation in *Europe* the least able to pay one, all Circumstances considered.

There is no disputing that it is the Interest of the Queen of *Hungary* and the King *Sardinia*, to confederate closely ; and I think it will be as little controverted, that the *Milanese*, the *Mantuan*, and the *Parmesan* and its Territories, may very well support, in Pay and all Necessaries, 30,000 Men, which, by the aforesaid Fifth Article, is the Number the Queen of *Hungary* agrees to keep on foot for her own Security. I have been in these Countries, and therefore venture to assert that her *Hungarian* Majesty might pay and support 40,000 Men in the Countries she possesses in *Italy*, exclusive of *Tuscany*, which belongs to her

her Consort, and which, in such a critical Situation as the Present, could not reasonably hope avoiding the bearing a Proportion of the Burden of the War. Taking in then *Tuscany*, which might support and maintain 20,000 at least, I insist, that the Queen of *Hungary* might singly oppose the Power of the whole House of *Bourbon* in *Italy*, provided we guard the Sea, and the Court of *Turin* the Passages of the *Alps*, which may always be done in spite of *France*, by so moderate a Force as 25 or 30,000 Men. The World may judge then from our Liberality, in consequence of this Treaty of *Worms*, of how little Weight their exhausted Country is with our Statesmen; how ill we compute the Force of others, and how little we know our own? and how lavish, without Occasion, and when we are least able to bear even a necessary Expence.

By the same Article (fifth) the King of Sardinia stipulates to keep on foot 40,000 Foot, and 5000 Horse, which I admit to be an Expence he can't well defray out of the ordinary annual Revenues of his Dominions beyond the *Alps*. As for the Duchy of *Savoy*, its being in the *Spanish* Hands, does not render the Circumstances of his *Sardinian* Majesty worse, in Point of Revenue, because, if he had it to

guard, as it lies open to *France*, his Expence to preserve it would greatly exceed the Revenue, either ordinary or extraordinary, of that part of his Dominions. But let us examine whether that Prince may not take measures for maintaining 45,000 Men, though his ordinary Revenue should not suffice.

It is agreed that he may maintain 25,000 or 30,000 Men without over-burdening his Subjects, or retrenching the ordinary Expence of his Court. This Number, without any Doubt, as already observed, would suffice to guard the Passages of the *Alps*, if the Queen would exert herself in other Parts. But if the whole Number of 45,000 was absolutely necessary, why might not the King of *Sardinia*, by making an extraordinary Effort, be able to maintain such a Force? The Method is very plain, the easiest in the World, and which his Minister at our Court, if he was at any loss, might point out to him from the annual Examples in this more flourishing Nation.

His *Sardinian* Majesty has nothing in Nature to do, but to anticipate, as we have done almost constantly for fifty Years together, part of his Revenue, upon which he will raise such a Sum as will pay his Army. My Life, he will find Adventurers in

in all the trading Cities of *Europe*, not excepting those of *France*, who will advance him whatever Sums he may want, provided he gives good Interest, and assigns over good Branches of his Revenue as Security.

But however natural and obvious this Method be, for my own part, I do not in the least condemn his *Sardinian* Majesty for not following it. For who would Mortgage his Estate, if he could find those who would ease him of the Expence and Perplexity? You will observe, by casting your Eye on the Eighth Article of this Treaty, that he found such *Friends* in this over-generous Nation. *And in order*, says the Patriot Negotiator, *to assist in bearing so extraordinary Expence*. — 'Tis hard, that in so many Years as we have been *assisting in bearing the Expence of others*, our Ministers have never found or so much as attempted finding out any Court or Nation that would be Good-natured enough to bear some small Share of our Expence. — Well, but the Article goes on — *As his Sardinian Majesty's Revenues can't maintain such a number of Troops as 45,000, &c. his Majesty of Great Britain engages to pay him 200,000 l. per Annum, &c.*

I

Dear

Dear Sir, ruminate a little on this princely Generosity, I should have said ministerial Prodigality; because our Ministers are fully acquainted, though his Majesty may not, with the Miseries of their Country, and her Inability to maintain even her own Armies and Fleets. What Heart does not beat with Indignation, to see a Nation burdened with *fifty odd Millions* of Debt, overwhelmed with Taxes, and decreasing in Commerce, running wantonly into an enormous Expence, and increasing that Expence, by stipulating to pay Subsidies to Princes infinitely happier, and richer, all Things considered, than those obliged to pay? My dear Friend, can any Man assign a Reason, why the Court of *L——n* would not let that of *Turin* try its own Strength? If all the King of *Sardinia's* Revenues had been mortgaged, there might be some Colour for increasing that on ours. If that Prince and his Predecessors had been for threescore Years mortgaging Branch after Branch; if they had no Branches, or but very few free; if they had taxed so high as to have no manner of Room for an Augmentation: In such case, indeed, an *Englishman* would not repine to pay a fifth Shilling in the Pound, to relieve and secure him.

But

But as the Case stands, on the Foundation of Truth and Reality which it rest, is there common Prudence in easing his *Sardinian* Majesty of a Burden he was able, and must be obliged to take upon himself, for his own Security, and lay it on the Shoulders of a People in *Europe* the least in a Condition to bear it? Why might not the Revenues of *Piedmont* and *Sardinia* be mortgaged as well as those of *England*? Was it not favour enough for this Nation to secure *Italy* by Sea? Is not the Expence of keeping *fifty Men of War* of the Line, for Years, at so great a Distance from home, where most of the Expence must center with *Italians*, enough for an over-burdened Nation as we are, without charging ourselves with the Expence of *Land-Forces* on the Banks of the *Po*, when (God help us!) we are already over-charged and over-run with Military Drones, idling, hectoring, and lording it on the Banks of the *Thames*, *Severn* and *Humber*?

I have already taken notice, that his *Sardinian* Majesty might have raised what Money he wanted on his Revenues; but did any Scruple remain that People might be backward in lending without better Security than an absolute Prince's Will, we might have become his Securities, or lent him

him the Money at a moderate Interest, such as we pay ourselves for an immense Sum. This would have answer'd the present Exigencies of that Prince, would have been an Ease to a sinking Nation, would have answer'd all the Purposes that could be possibly proposed by making an annual Present of 200,000 *l.* a Year, and would have shewn, that some Consideration is had, by our Governors, to the unhappy Circumstances of their Mother-Country.

But you will say, how can it be expected, in the Instance before us, that a *Patriot Concern* for this bleeding Nation should affect the Hearts of a Ministry, that had put the Publick to a Million Expence not many Years ago, to secure the *richest Prince in Europe* from being insulted or surpriz'd by a neighbouring Power? When the King of *Portugal* requested the Succour of a *British* Fleet, to protect his Dominions and Commerce from the threaten'd Insults of *Spain*, in this Reign, was it not natural, was it not reasonable to desire that he might defray the Expence of such a naval Armament? He could not plead Inability, as his *Sardinian* Majesty does, being undoubtedly the most money'd Prince in *Europe*, except a certain *E—r* of the *E—z*, who is suppos'd, upon no very fallible Grounds, to have hoarded up more

Bullion

Bullion in a certain old Castle, than the Banks of *England* and *Holland* contain.

'Tis true, that expensive Transaction was during the late Administration, and therefore you will say the present are not chargeable with it.—Supposing this to be some Plea in favour of a few of the present Ministry, the Majority being composed of the old, 'tis no manner of Excuse to the Publick. The People soar higher, and center their Welfare in the paternal Care of the P——e.—But let me stop here, adding only, that his *Portuguese* Majesty, in the late Administration, ought to have been permitted to be at the Expence of securing himself, because he was far better able to bear it than we ; and that his *Sardinian* Majesty, in the present, ought to have been oblig'd, for his own Safety, to mortgage Part of his Revenue, rather than that the Revenues of *England* should be double mortgag'd, that he may bask in the Plenty of a clear Revenue, while we sweat and struggle with the mighty Hardships brought upon us by the Prodigality of our *Trustees*.

Tho' I am an Advocate for national *Oeconomy*, I would not have you think that I am one of your over-parcimonious Grubs, who would starve a good Cause, or shut my Fist to a real Object. I willingly

lingly consented to the Aid granted for the Use of the Queen of *Hungary*, the two last Years, because the Torrent against her was too sudden and impetuous to be withstood by her singly. But Sir, let me add, that I am of Opinion her Condition is much alter'd, and therefore shall very unwillingly give my Assent to the Burdening an exhausted Nation, the present Year, in order to leave a Princess, victorious in the Field, quite at her Ease in Possession of clear Revenues. I have a very tender Regard for the House of *Austria*, but have a greater for old *England*; and for this Reason shou'd be glad our Statesmen wou'd let that August House try its own Strength for once. What if the Revenues of the *Arch Dutchy*, those of *Bohemia*, and even those of the *Netherlands* were Mortgag'd? I engage to find Men at *Frankfort*, *Lepwick*, *Hambourgh*, *Amsterdam*, *Antwerp*, and *London*, who will advance her a Million or two *Sterling* on these Funds. But, as in the other Case, I am not against facilitating the Loan by becoming Surety for our good Ally, shou'd the Lenders insist upon our Security. And in such Case, as well as for the Money already given that Princess, I shou'd not be sorry, tho' mistaken, that our Ministers wou'd insist that she shou'd put *Ostend* and *Newport* into our Hands. I shou'd be

greatly Rejoiced to see any of that good old *English* Queen, *Elizabeth's* Maxims practised in my Days.

Let us take a Cursory View of the present Situation and Circumstances of the Queen of *Hungary*, to see if there be an absolute Necessity of further adding to our own Burden to lessen her's: and without *absolute Necessity*, I hope neither she nor her Advocates, will expect that we shou'd increase the Weight of the Load which is already beyond our natural Strength. This leads me to employ a Moment in considering our present Circumstances, and the Nature of the artificial Strength of a Nation. The Subject, however foreign it may be deem'd to the Design of this Letter, I am sure it is the Interest and Duty of every *Englishman* to consider it, especially, at a Time when his Country is on the Verge of Ruin, and as near Bankruptcy as ever Nation was, that look'd with a florid Face of Wealth and Credit, tho' all the Time in a deep, I may say a galloping Consumption.

Before the *Revolution*, which tho' a good Thing in itself, cost us an immense Treasure, our Taxes were scarce felt by the People; and no Wonder, because, tho' our Trade flourish'd, the whole Expence of the Crown and Government seldom exceeded *two Millions.*

lions. But the Wars in Consequence of the *Revolution*, being very expensive by our bearing, as we do at present, a far greater Proportion than we needed or were oblig'd to in Prudence, instead of *Two* we were under a Necessity of expending *Five*, and often *Six* and *Seven* Millions yearly. To raise this excessive Sum within the Year wou'd alarm the People, and perhaps induce them to repent them of the late Exchange of Princes they had made. To prevent any Consequences injurious to the new System, instead of creating Funds for so large a Sum, the Court artfully created Funds for the Payment of the Interest only, which, for some time was little felt, and not at all perceived by the Bulk of the People. Thus was the Nation by little and little, almost imperceptibly, burthen'd and b——'d.

This Scheme, how destructive soever to the Public, was of no small Service to the Court, if it may be said, that any Scheme can be of Service to, or ought to be embrac'd by a Court, whis is repugnant to the Interest of the Governed. By this anticipating Scheme a new Power or Interest was created in this State, unknown to the Constitution, which was solely at the Beck and under the Influence of the Court. This was, what is call'd a Money'd Interest, grafted

grafted on the Credit given to the Government by the Mortgages on the new Funds. This money'd Interest, or rather Power arising from Money, was wholly on the Side of the Court, as it ever will be ; and was often made Use of by her, to oppose the *Natural*, that is, the *Landed* Interest of the Nation, from whence have sprung all the big Evils we now feel and vainly complain of.

But this *money'd Power*, at last, by the Court's increasing it annually, becoming too bulky for its own Force, it became necessary to form a new Scheme in order to supply by Art the Deficiencies of Nature. And thus came our Paper and *Artificial* Credit to be establish'd ; which, while Trade and Manufactures thrive, and there is a certain *Quantum* of Specie in the Kingdom, may answer the Purposes of Money itself. But when ever there happens a Stagnation of foreign Commerce and domestic Industry, and that there are more than ordinary Calls for our Coin from abroad, this artificial Strength will fail in Times of greatest Need and Danger.

Much more might be said to shew that all our Misfortunes, our present Unhappiness, are owing solely to the Errors or Wickedness of our Ministers, in creating such an unnatural Power in the Land as must

must inevitably undo us sooner or later. But it being far from my Intention to enter deeply and regularly into a Subject which would swell my Letter to the Size of *Faction detected*, I shall only observe, from what has been said of Artificial Credit or Strength, that considering the great Declension of our Trade and Industry, and the vast Drains upon our Bullion, it becomes extremely necessary for our Guardians not only to lessen those Calls upon us from Abroad, but the Publick Expence even at Home ; it being with Bodies Politic as with the Natural ; suffer the radical Moisture to be exhausted or dried up, and in vain shall Art attempt to support the Fabrick.

Not to mention the Drain upon us to Foreigners since the *Revolution*, particularly since the *Accession*, let it be considered how the Sluice has been widen'd since *New Men* have mixed with the late Minister's Creatures. To go no farther back than the last Year, what an immense Treasure was exported out of this poor consumptive Country ? I shall, to indulge your Curiosity and my own Fancy, set down the *Items* of such of our Out-goings, as will not, or rather can never return to us.----You are to take Notice, that this vast Sum was necessarily sent abroad in Bullion coin'd or uncoin'd ; for, on these Occasions,

casions, our Artificial or Paper Strength won't avail ; and now the *Spanish* Markets are shut up from us, our Exports in Manufactures scarce answer our Imports for Luxury. The *cherish'd Hanoverians* in our Pay won't take our Paper, nor can our National Troops subsist in a foreign Country on such Diet, however well they may be able to live upon it at Home, through the Credulity of their Countrymen.

Articles of our Expence last Year, for which we have been obliged to send *Bullion* out of the Kingdom ; *viz.*

L.

The Expence of the Court at	500,000
<i>Hanover</i> and in the Field,	
at least - - - - -	650,000
To 16000 <i>Hanoverians</i> in Pay	
only - - - - -	50,000
Their additional Expence during the Campaign - - - - -	
To 6000 <i>Hessians</i> in Pay only,	220,000
about - - - - -	
Additional Expence during the Campaign - - - - -	20,000
To our own National Troops,	900,000
in Number about 20,0000,	
including the Extraordinaries of the Campaign - - -	500,000
To the Queen of <i>Hungary</i> - -	
	To

To the King of <i>Sardinia</i> ---	200,000
To fresh Provisions and other necessary Expences created by our Fleet in the <i>Mediterranean</i> , which must have been paid in Bullion, and laid out in <i>Italy</i> , about ---	200,000

	3,250,000

I have put down these *Items* just as they occurred to me, without consulting any Publick Accounts or Authorities, it being sufficient for my Purpose to shew, that a Sum exceeding *Three Millions* must necessarily have been exported in *Bullion*, the last Year only, to answer the Calls upon us from abroad in Consequence of the sanguine Schemes of our New Task-masters. This Drain upon our *Natural Strength* cannot possibly be prevented or supplied by our *Artificial*, therefore must we inevitably be exhausted and ruined, if a Stop be not suddenly put to Measures which hurry the Nation to such *Destruction*. And as no Change of Measures can answer the Purpose, without contracting the Publick Expence, it is my Busines and Duty, yours, my worthy Friend, and that of all *Englishmen*, to inspect our Affairs, and see where a Saving might be made with Safety, even upon the Footing of our *English Machiavel's*

vel's Scheme of reducing *France* and aggrandizing the House of *Austria*; I should have said, the dear E-----e.

It was with this View that I employ'd so many of my Moments, to shew there was no Necessity of our tying ourselves down, as we are by this wonderful Treaty, to pay the King of *Sardinia* a Subsidy of 200,000 *L.* during the *War*, a Space of Time which is too general and indefinite; that he is better able to bear his own Expence, than we are to take it upon ourselves; that if we had not taken up his Burden, he must have been obliged to lay it upon his own Shoulders, in order to secure all that is dear to Man; and that the Common Cause could not suffer, if we had not been so very eager to press foreign Princes to take our Money. It is with the same laudable View that I hinted the Examining, if the present Circumstances of her *Hungarian* Majesty will admit of our keeping 500,000 *L.* of our Coin at home, more this Year than the last.

I am heartily in the Interest of that Heroick Prince's, and sincerely wish her Success; tho' it be a Doubt with me, whether our aggrandizing the House of *Austria* beyond what it is, or even so high as it is, be consistent with our Scheme, chimerical as it may be, of fixing the *European* Balance

lance of Power. *Germany* and the *Maritime* Powers, if *Germany* be united, will eternally be an Over-inatch for the House of *Bourbon*. But if the *Germanick* Body apprehends any Danger from the Power of any of its own Members, there will not, there cannot be that Union I speak of. And this was the reason that *France* had so often the Advantage in all her Disputes with the Empire, even since the *Westphalian* Treaties. The *Germanick* Body, being always jealous of the Power and Designs of the House of *Austria*, there was no Possibility of cementing them in the General Cause. Another Reason also might be assigned for the ill Success of the first general War against *France*, and of the little Advantages accruing from the great Success of the latter ; but as this Digression would necessarily oblige me to a Recapitulation of the *Infidelities* of the *Germanick* Body to the Maritime Powers, particularly of the House of *Austria*, and carry me too great a Length, I will put an End to it, by observing, that no People in *Europe* understand better or pursue their Interest more intensely than the *Germans*. They have already got the best part of the *Bullion* of *France* and *England*, by their addressful Broils and Bustles ; and if they can keep up the Farce a few Years longer, I am

am sure they won't leave a *Guinea* or *Crown Piece* in *England*. *France* is already wise enough to see into the mysterious *Deception*, and prudently has withdrawn, and contracts herself within her own *Bounds*. She can't bring back, except it be by furnishing to the *Luxury* of *Germans*, the Millions she lately spent in *Germany*; but by her present *Scheme* she effectually takes care they shall have no more of her *Louis*.

But poor *England*, alas! takes quite another Course: Her Statesmen, far from improving by Experience or Example, are plunging deeper into the Snares laid for them by the Patriot Politicians of *Germany*. Instead of healing the Differences, I should say attempting to heal the Differences of *Germany*, for *Germany* won't easily be persuaded to make up Quarrels, or adjust Disputes, which draw so great Treasure into their Country; instead of any Scheme so wise and salutary, our Statesmen not only foment the Differences, but kindle up the Flames of War in *Germany* and *Italy*, by feeding the Ambition of Princes intent to enlarge their Dominions, tho' it should be at the risque of inflaming all *Europe*, and ruining their best Allies.—But upon our *Primier*'s own Scheme, if any he has except ingrossing all Power and Confidence to himself, by indulging the sickly Passion of ——— for Arms, Reviews, and En-

campments ; I say upon that great Statesman's own Scheme, let us see if the Queen of *Hungary* be not able, without a Subsidy from us, to support her part of the intended War, and make as good a Figure in it as even the mighty *Hero* of the last Campaign could wish or *expects*. - I say, *expects* ; because I am satisfied, let Professions be never so loud and favourable to the Queen of *Hungary*, it is not intended she shall be such a Gainer by the War, was it practicable she should gain by it, as to affect the Interest or inspire the Jealousy of the dear E-----e ; of which, in no Instance, fight is ever to be lost.

It is necessary, towards making this Discussion, to suppose a Plan of Operation ; and I think there cannot be one more reasonable, than the following. *Italy* is to be secured, and Conquests are to be made upon *France* on the Side of *Alsace* and *Lorrain*, to compensate for the Loss of *Silesia*, on a Supposition that *Bavaria* must be restored. There can be no other Plan, unless we cou'd induce the *Dutch* and other Powers to join in wresting *French Flanders* from the Crown. But as there is scarce a Probability that *Holland* will engage in a general War to oblige the Queen of *Hungary* or her Allies, 'tis likely the intended Conquests are to be made on the

Rhine and *Moselle*, upon the Foot of my supposed Plan as above.

This being premised, we have shewn already, that *Italy* may be secured by the joint Forces of their *Hungarian* and *Sardinian* Majesties, we commanding the Sea. We have likewise shewn, that the Dominions of the House of *Austria* in *Italy* can pay and maintain a much greater Number of Forces than is necessary for the *Queen* to bring against any Power she has to fear in that Country; and that the King of *Sardinia* may, by making common Efforts, shut out the combined Powers of *France* and *Spain* from entering *Italy* by the *Alps*. There remains then but to shew, that the *Queen* can maintain 220,000 Men next Campaign, which is more than sufficient, joined with her Ally our Sovereign, and the *Dutch* Auxiliaries, to push even to the Gates of *Paris*, if the Diet or *Germanick* Body interfere not in favour of the Emperor, consequently in favour of *France*.

Should any of the principal Members of the *Germanick* Body, particularly the King of *Prussia*, join the Emperor, and form a great Army to recover *Bavaria*, or invade any of the *Austrian* Possessions in the Empire, I won't suppose the *Queen* would be able at once to make head against so formidable a Confederacy at Home, and make

make Conquests Abroad. But in such Case what are we a doing? Is it prudent we should run into an extravagant Expence, and buoy up that Princess, without being sure that no such formidable Confederacy is forming, or will be formed in favour of the Emperor? And if there be any Reason to apprehend that such a Confederacy is intended, would it not be more eligible to advise that Princess to accept of moderate and safe Terms of Peace, than continue a War which she, with more and richer Allies than she has, could not support against the Empire on one hand and *France* and *Spain* on the other? Does not the advising her to a Continuance of the War, under such dreadful Circumstances as being obliged to guard against a formidable Army at her Threshold, indicate an Intention rather of weakening than strengthening the House of *Austria*? And whatever be the Professions of a certain *Ally* of the Queen's, how vast soever be the Preparations and Expence of this Nation, does it not appear, if there be such a Confederacy in the Empire, that we are steer'd by the *Rudder* of *Hanover*, it not being the Interest of the E———e, tho' it may be of *England*, that the House of *Austria* should be ever in a Condition to give Jealousy to the States of the Empire?

But

But on a Supposition, which I confess appears to me to have no Foundation, that the Queen will have no such formidable Confederacy to dread, and may therefore be at full liberty to fall in with our Scheme of reducing *France*; why may she not be able to maintain 220,000 Men for that Purpose, without leaning upon us, a sinking Nation, for a Subsidy of 500,000 *l.*?

Including 20,000 Auxiliary *Dutch*, our Monarch will bring 62,000 Men into the Field; and including such *Austrian* Forces as may be spar'd from the *Netherlands*, as last Year, the combin'd Army under our Prince's Command will be near 80,000 Men; an Army so strong, that *France* can never withstand it, on the Side of the *Moselle*, if it be well conducted, and that the Queen forms two more Armies of 100,000 each in the Upper and Lower *Alsace*.

The only Difficulty remaining, is, whether the Queen can support the Expence of 200 or 220,000 Men for this Service. It is not doubted that she has or may have this or any Number of Men she pleases, if she can pay them. It is admitted, that the Expence of 220,000 Men, as they are paid and maintained in *Germany*, particularly by the *Austrian* Family, won't stand in so much as one third of the Number wou'd here in *England*. We will suppose then that

that the Queen might be obliged to expend *two Millions* Sterling in the Support of such an Army. Suppose, at the same time, she were obliged to borrow this whole Sum ; where would be the great Harm, since it is in her own Cause, and to fight her own Quarrels ? But she may and actually raises, she and her Consort together, a greater Sum than this every Year, without mortgaging. She has raised above a Fourth of the Sum last Year in *Bavaria* ; *Tuscany* yields above 400,000*l.* neat Money annually ; and *Bohemia*, *Moravia*, and *Austria*, not to mention *Tirol*, the *Forest Towns*, *Hungary*, *Transylvania*, and her other Dominions in that part of *Europe*, produce above a *Million* Sterling a Year. Let us then add to these the Revenues of the *Netherlands*, which produce at this time above 500,000*l.* a Year, we shall find that the present Revenues of that Princess produce, at a moderate Computation, little short of three Millions Sterling.

But supposing it did not produce half this Sum, might she not raise what Sums she wants on the Credit of it, as has been before observed ? And would it not be more natural and reasonable that she should mortgage, and put herself to some Inconveniency, in her own Cause, and to help herself, than that We should plunge ourselves

selves so irrecoverably into Debts and Difficulties, as never to be able to extricate ourselves, or even Posterity.

Taking then, my worthy Friend, the present Measures of our Statesmen in any Light, 'tis the highest Imprudence, 'tis the most excessive Prodigality to dole away the poor Remains of our Riches in Subsidies to either of our present Allies. If the Empire confederate against the Queen, in Favour of its Head, the War is ridiculous, and all our Expence is flung away: If no such Confederacy be form'd, the Queen is able, as has been shewn, to support her Share of the War, without a money'd Aid from us. So that, taking the Matter in either View, turning it in either Shape, I cannot but be steadily of Opinion, that we should put a Stop to our Liberality to a Princeſſ, who is indisputably in a far more happy Situation, in Point of Revenue, than this over-burden'd, over-incumber'd Nation.--My Concern for the miserable Condition our Country is reduced to, diverted me for a while from my present principal Consideration, which was that on the Treaty of *Worms*.

As the Treaty is publish'd since I begun my Letter, I shall fend it you intire, to save you and myself the Trouble of an Insertion of the Provisional Convention which I promis'd you; and shall, for the same Reason, avoid inserting any more Articles of the Treaty, except the 10th, which is of too great Consequence, and of too ex-

traordinary a Nature, not to be inserted at large. 'Tis perhaps the most extraordinary Article either you or I, or even the Negotiator himself, ever saw in any Treaty enter'd into by this, or indeed any other Crown. But, prior to it, you will observe by the second Article, *That the Allies engage themselves afresh to a most express Guaranty of all the Kingdoms, States, Countries, and Dominions which they are now in Possession of, or ought to possess by Virtue*—of a String of Treaties, reaching from the Year 1703 to the present time.

I need not point out to you, when the Words of this Article are so express, that the *Electorate* is guarantied by this Treaty. *States, Countries, and Dominions, which they are now in Possession of*, are Words which imply the Guaranty of *Hanover* too obviously and strongly, for us to doubt that the Negotiator's Eye was not fix'd on old *England* alone. But this Article seems to me to contain something more unnatural than a Guaranty of the *Electorate*, and that is, a Guaranty by us of Countries, which, by the *Quadruple Alliance*; the Princes of the House of *Austria* were never to possess. That the Absurdity of our guarantying, without any Restriction, all the Countries now posseſſ'd by the Queen of *Hungary*, and that you may see my Objection more clearly, I will trouble you here with an Insertion of Part of the Eighth Article of the *Quadruple Alliance*, which you will observe

serve to be confirm'd by this Second Article of the Treaty of *Worms*, on which I am animadverting.

Part of the Eighth Article of the Quadruple Alliance.

By this Article the late Emperor, with the Consent of the Empire, was at Liberty to dispose of the *Eventual Investiture* of *Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia*, secur'd by this Treaty to *Don Carlos*, if the King of *Spain* did not accede to the Treaty by a time limited; and the Article ends with *these Words*, upon which my present Objection is founded: “ This Declaation
 “ being added, that in no Time or Case
 “ whatever either his Imperial Majesty, or
 “ any Prince of the House of Austria,
 “ who shall possess the Kingdoms and Pro-
 “ vinces of *Italy*, may assert or gain to
 “ himself the said Dutchies of *Tuscany* and
 “ *Parma*. ” — I need not point out a Contradiction so very evident, as our becoming Guaranties of the Queen of *Hungary*’s Possession of *Parma*, which we were obliged by the *Quadruple Alliance* to prevent being ever possess'd by a Prince of the House of *Austria*. This Possession and Guaranty, however, being of no very weighty Consequence to these Nations, what I said of them was only to shew the Inaccuracy or Negligence of our most refin'd Politicians, as a Proof, that, one way or other, Foreigners don't wrong us in saying that we

are better Soldiers than Statesmen. But what puts the Truth of this Portraiture of our Nation out of all Doubt, is the 10th Article of this celebrated Treaty, which is as follows :

Tenth Article of the Treaty of Worms.

Besides, as it is of Importance to the publick Cause, that his Majesty the King of *Sardinia* should have an immediate Communication of his Dominions with the Sea, and with the Maritime Powers, her Majesty the Queen of *Hungary* and *Bohemia* yields to him all the Rights which she may have in any Manner, and upon any Title whatsoever, to the Town and Marquisate of *Final*; which Rights she yields and transfers, without any Restriction, to the said King, in the same manner as she does the Countries describ'd in the foregoing Article, in the just Expectation that the Republick of *Genoa* will facilitate, as far as shall be necessary, a Disposition so indispensably requisite for the Liberty and Security, both present and future, of *Italy*, in Consideration of the Sum which shall be found to be due to the said Republick, without his Majesty the King of *Sardinia*, or her Majesty the Queen of *Hungary*, being obliged to contribute to the Payment of the said Sum. Provided that the Town of *Final* be, and remain for ever a Free Port, as *Leghorn*; and that it shall be allowable for his Majesty the King of *Sardinia* to

re-

re-establish there the Forts which have been demolish'd, or to cause others to be built, according as he shall judge convenient.

Here, Sir, is perhaps one of the most extraordinary, unprecedented Articles that ever was inserted in any Treaty between Princes associating for maintaining *Justice*, which includes the Maintenance of the Ballance of Power: For there can be no Ballance or Equality of Power, unless such Power be founded in Justice.

By the preceeding Article the Town and Marquisate of *Final*, the actual Possessions and Property of the State of *Genoa*, are given to the King of *Sardinia*; and by whom? By the Queen of *Hungary*, who has no Title of her own, and by *Great Britain*, whose Interest it was that they shou'd remain with the present Possessors, and who had guarantyed the Possession to them by the fourth Article of the *Quadruple Alliance*, where all the Powers concern'd in that general Treaty approve, tacitely at least, the Cession made of that Town and Marquisate to the Republic of *Genoa* by the late Emperor in 1713. Our Guaranty of *Final*, amongst the other Provinces of *Italy* yielded up by *Philip V.* to the late Emperor, is express, by the *Quadruple Alliance*; and I am grossly mistaken if the following Words of the fourth Article of the said Treaty don't imply our Approbation of the Cession of that Mar-

Marquisate to the Republic of *Genoa* in 1713.—By this Article, *Philip V.* renounces in Favour of the late Emperor, all his Claims in *Italy* and the *Netherlands*; and the Article goes on ; “ and he doth “ wholly abdicate all Rights, Kingdoms “ and Provinces in *Italy*, which heretofore “ belong’d to the *Spanish Monarchy*, a-“ mongst which the Marquisite of *FINAL*, “ yielded by his *Imperial Majesty* to the “ *Republick of Genoa* in the Year 1713, “ is understood to be expressly comprehend-“ ed ; &c.”---If these last Words were not inserted to shew an Approbation of the *Cession*, I am sure the Insertion was not needless only, but without Meaning. What was it to the King of *Spain* who had *Final*, since he renounced his Right to it? or what Need cou’d there be of mentioning the *Cession* to *Genoa*, if it was not that thereby it shou’d be understood as ratified, and approv’d by all the Parties to the Treaty?

If the Negotiators of the Treaty of *Worms* did not inspect this and all other Treaties which might regard this Point, the Negligence was unpardonable, and the rather, that Possessions of great Consequence to a Neutral Power, were to be transfer’d. But the Neglect was still less excusable, if the Instrument, by which the *Cession* was made by the late Emperor, was not consulted. But as it can’t be suppos’d that so cautious and consummate

a Statesman as our Minister at *Worms*, wou'd engage the Honour and Interest of his Prince and Country inadvertently, it may be presumed that he had every Treaty and Instrument relating to this Affair before him : And on this Supposition, some Difficulties occur, which don't redound greatly to the Credit of our Country in Matters of Negotiation. They are these :

Recourse was had to the Instrument of *Cession*, and to the Treaties wherein it is mention'd and approved, and it was conceiv'd from thence, that the Queen of *Hungary* either had or had not a Right in her which she might transfer. If it was thought she had no Right, it was a Wrong to the King of *Sardinia* to buoy him up with a Chimera ; it was a flagrant Injustice to the Republick of *Genoa* to give a Colourable Title to a Prince whom she supposes to be a Powerful, Ambitious, Jealous Neighbour, who wanted such, or any varnish'd Pretext, to wrest that Marquisate from her by Force : it was laying a Foundation for new Broils and Wars in *Italy* ; and it was meditately destroying an Equality or Ballance of Power in that Part of *Europe*, for the Preservation of which, and its Tranquillity, the Treaty of *Worms* seems peculiarly calculated.

Tho' it appears to all the rest of Mankind, except the Negotiators at *Worms*, that the Sale of *Final* by the late Emperor was absolute, containing, neither implied

nor expressly, any thing like or relative to a Mortgage, or a Power or Equity of Redemption ; and tho' all others except the aforesaid *Plenipo*'s, suppose the Approbation of the said Sale to the *Genoese*, by the Parties to the *Quadruple* Alliance, of whom the late King *George I.* was one of the chief and principal ; yet, I say, notwithstanding the Appearance is strong against them, be it supposed, that the *Plenipo*'s saw the Right of the Queen of *Hungary* to redeem, let us examine how far it was the Interest of this Nation that the King of *Sardinia* should, either by Force or otherwise, get Possession of the Port of *Final*, as it must be design'd he should, if it be supposed that the Republick has it only in Mortgage.

If that Prince attempts forcing himself into Possession whilst the present War lasts, there is scarce a Doubt that the Republick will avail itself of the Alliance of *France* and *Spain*, who wou'd willingly lay hold of an Occasion of drawing the State of *Genoa* into an Alliance against the present Allies of *Worms* : Besides, this Title given the King of *Sardinia*, in all Probability, will be a Means of prolonging the War in *Italy*, which is so much our Interest to see ended. But shou'd that Prince let his Claim lie dormant during the present War, we may conclude he will enforce it the first favourable Opportunity, which must necessarily occasion fresh Troubles and another War in *Italy* ;

Italy; it being so essentially the Interest of *Genoa*, and indeed of all the other Powers of *Italy* to prevent the farther Aggrandizement of the House of *Savoy*. So that whenever the King of *Sardinia* attempts forcing himself into the Possession of *Final*, it is almost indubitable that it will occasion a War, and probably a general one, in *Italy*; for Allies and Parties are seldom wanting on such Occasions.

But supposing the Republick of *Genoa*, in Deference to this Nation, or Dread of its Maritime Power, should acquiesce with the Views of the able Negotiators at *Worms*, and resign *Final* peaceably on the Payment of the Mortgage-Money, and Interest thereof, deducting what she may have received in Revenue over and above the Expence incur'd. In such Case, which must always be a Force, and consequently an Injustice, who is to re-imburse the vast Sums due to the Republick? The Queen of *Hungary* and the King of *Sardinia* are literally exonerated by this very Treaty; and yet there is no denying, that by the aforesaid 10th Article, *the Sum which shall be found to be due, shall be paid to the Republick before she parts with the Possession*.

We know the Principal Sum paid by the Republick to the late Emperor, so long ago as the Year 1713, was 1,200,000 *Pieces of Eight*, or 300,000 *l.* Sterling; but to what an Interest for twenty Years, even after reasonable Deductions, may swell this Sum, I can't say; but surely even the Principal of 300,000 *l.* is a Sum which *England* is very ill able to pay at this time, or spare at any time for the Aggrandizement of a

Prince whom it concerns her to watch and keep within certain Bounds. It is true, there are no express Words that oblige *England* to this Payment ; but I must be allowed to say, that there is neither *Justice* nor *Sense* in this Tenth Article, unless it was intended that this unhappy Nation should be saddled with it. If it was intended there should be no pecuniary Compensation made to the Republick, the Injustice seems of the blackest hue ; if the Payment was really intended, who but one of the Contractors or Parties to this Treaty should be held responsible ? And since two of the Parties are expressly exempted by the Article from the Payment, it seems reasonable, I may say indispensable, that the *third*, that is, *Great Britain*, should be obliged to it. And for this Reason, tho' by this very Article there be an equitable Admission of this Nation's being liable to the Payment of this vast Sum ; yet there is room at least for a Supposition, that there may be a *separate* and *secret* Article, by which this bleeding unhappy Country is made clearly and absolutely liable. But be that as it may, if Princely and private *Equity* are not different, I apprehend this Nation's liable, by the Construction of this 10th Article, or will be so, if the Treaty should be as much approved and relished by the Majority of certain august Assemblies, as it is now disprov'd and disrelish'd by the Majority of the People without doors.

The Cession of the Queen of Hungary's Title to *Final* to the King of *Sardinia*, is founded upon two Reasons by the Article, *viz.* *That that Prince*

Prince might have a Communication of his Dominions with the Sea, and with the Maritime Powers; and that the present and future Security and Liberty of Italy may be preserv'd. One would be apt to think, from the many Slips and Over-sights in this Treaty, that it was negotiated over a *Bottle*, and sign'd on the Head of a *Drum*. *Final* is stript from *Genoa*, that the King of *Sardinia*, who has the Ports of *Nice* and *Villa-franca* near the Coast of *Provence*, and *Oneglia* not far from *Final*, in his actual Possession, should have a Communication of his Dominions with the Sea, and with the Maritime Powers. Surely there were no Maps, but of *Alsace* and *Lorraine*, to be had at *Worms*!----My dear Friend, what can one say, when he sees such Blunders committed by Men that are supposed to steer the Bark of State? But *Homer* himself nodded sometimes, tho' the Critics are all silent as to any Passion he might have had for *Champaign* or *Burgundy*, more than for plain *Port* or *Pontac*.

And as for the Liberty and Security of *Italy*, I have already shewn, that the *Cession* of *Final*, by this Treaty, is far more likely to embroil than secure that Part of the Continent; it being natural for the King of *Sardinia* to attempt getting Possession of a Territory so convenient to him, and for the *Republic* to move Heaven and Earth in order to keep a Possession, without which it cannot possibly subsist and maintain its present Commerce and Freedom. I cannot help commiserating the Unhappiness of that poor, but old and venerable Commonwealth, if, in order to secure, upon the Plan of our Negotiators, the Li-

berty of *Italy*, of which she has been one of the most considerable Barriers, Time immemorial, she should be reduced to the Necessity of becoming an open Enemy to *England*, which she loves and dreads, or losing her own Liberty and Security. — A vexatious, a cruel Dilemma, which an inoffensive neutral State is reduced to, by the refin'd Politics of our *British Luminary*; an Epithet bestow'd on one of our chief Ministers by a late accurate and polite *German** Writer.

It may seem extraordinary to you and many others, that the King of *Sardinia* should insist on a Cession of Rights from the Queen of *Hungary*, which he knew to be vague, yet would alarm most of the Powers of *Italy*. But, Sir, to me, who know the Designs of that penetrating Prince, and the high Value he sets on *Final*, his Conduct, in regard to the Cession of this chimerical Right, seems not at all surprising or extraordinary: But what surprizes and concerns me much more is, that it was not perceiv'd that the King of *Sardinia*'s Eagerness and Reasons for desiring to have any Title to *Final*, were such as should have induced an *Englishman* to refuse him absolutely any sort of Title whatever. But, alas! when have we seen the Interest of *England* consulted or pursued?

That gallant Prince is an Ally at this time; but there is no Permanency in the Friendship of Princes, who ever were, and probably always will be sway'd by Self-interest. It is his Interest now to ally against *France*; but who can secure

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us that he, or some of his Descendants, may not be of other Sentiments when we have most Occasion of their Alliance? But, to wave this Consideration, there is yet another, which, as a Trading Nation, and Maritime Power, we ought never to lose Sight of ; and that is, far from its being our Interest to promote, as we do by this Treaty, the *Trade* and *Navigation* of other Powers, it is indubitably our Interest, and it should be the Attention of our Rulers, to prevent and guard against, as far as possible, every View, however distant it may be, to the Extension of Commerce, or Growth of a Maritime Power in any Part of *Europe*.

The Princes of the House of *Savoy*, being sensible that Power flows from Wealth, and that Wealth flows chiefly from Commerce, have been always intent upon establishing and encouraging Trade in their Territories; and for this End *Villa-franca* was declar'd a free Port in 1669, and a Treaty of Commerce was concluded by Duke *Charles Emanuel II.* the present King of *Sardinia*'s Grand-father, with our King *Charles II.* but as this Port was not contiguous to the Center of his Dominions in *Italy*, the Project came to nothing. But *Final* has all the Advantages, from its Situation, which the Court of *Turin* could wish; and tho' it has no regular Port, yet as the Road is good, it may be made as good and safe a Port as any in *Italy*; for that of *Genoa*, which is one of the best and fairest in the World, is artificial; and Nature was not so luxuriant at *Genoa* as at *Final*, before the Moles were made.

There being no doubt of the Views of his Sardinian Majesty, in regard to *Final*, let us examine how far the Execution of his Project may affect the Interests of this Nation ; but let me premise, that in the present State of Things, whilst *Final* remains in the Hands of the *Genoese*, there is no Probability, scarce a Possibility, that ever either our Power or Trade should be affected.

Final may be made a Port capable of the largest Men of War, and of containing a very great Number of Shipping. As it lies contiguous to the *Montferrat*, *Milanese*, *Mantuan*, and all the best of the King of *Sardinia*'s Dominions, there is no doubt, when once it is a free Port, and a safe one, that it will run away with all the Trade of *Genoa*, which now principally depends on furnishing the inland Countries. Trade begets Seamen, and a Prince who has a good Port, a good Trade, and may have Seamen now, will always have the Ambition to extend his Commerce, and for that End will endeavour to have a naval Force. Should this ever happen, and there is no very distant Appearance that it will, if *Final* be in the Possession of the House of *Savoy*, what shall hinder the Princes of that Family from granting Charters for an exclusive Trade to *Turky* and the *East-Indies*? You will say we may hinder any such Designs ; yes, by leaving *Final* with the present just Possessors, and not otherwise, without using Force. Why don't we hinder the *Swedes* and *Danes* from trading to the *East-Indies*?

As the *Genoese* are impotent at Sea, the *Turks* and *Moors* are constantly at Enmity with them ;

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from whence accrues no small Benefit to this Nation, by our being the Sea-carriers of *Italy*; but, *Final* in the Hands of the King of *Sardinia*, he will be at Peace with the *Barbarians*, and his Subjects will become the Carriers we are, because if they fail with Safety, *Italians* will always prefer them before Foreign Hereticks. Then, if we should ever be at Enmity with the House of *Savoy*, how precarious will our Trade be in those Seas, from Privateers fitted out and nestling in the fine Port of *Final*?

He who undertakes so weighty a Task as the Management of the Affairs of a Nation, with so many and so extensive Interests as ours, should have an Eye to Futurity, as well as to the Present and Past. From perusing this extraordinary Treaty, and these few inaccurate Observations of mine, you will be able to form a Judgment not only of the extensive Capacity, but the Patriotism of the Great Man, who had the national Interests under his Care and Management on the Banks of the *Rhine*. But before I conclude, let me point out the mighty Benefit obtain'd for us by this Treaty, in return for the vast Treasure employ'd for our Allies, and other signal Services.

This Benefit is procur'd for us by the 15th Article, where it is said, " That in Gratitude " for the generous Concern of his *Britannick* " Majesty for the public Security, and for theirs, " the Queen and King his present Allies, and for " that of *Italy* in particular, their Majesties do " not only confirm to the *British* Subjects the " Advantages of Commerce and Navigation, " which they enjoy in their respective Domi- " nions,

“ nions, but promise to secure them still farther
 “ to them, &c.”—Our Trade with the King of
 Sardinia’s Subjects, until he shall have got *Final*,
 can be of no sort of Consequence to us; and the
 Queen of *Hungary* has not a single Port in the
Italian Seas: Therefore may we look upon this
 Article as a political Blind, or the winding up of
 the Farce. But, was any thing else intended by
 it, why was not a *Tarrif* settled between us and
 the *Austrian Netherlands*, and a beneficial Tre-
 aty of Commerce concluded on that Footing, pre-
 vious to this of *Worms*? I remember it was ob-
 jected, and very justly, to the last Ministry of
 Queen *Anne*, that they had concluded with
France the general Treaty of Peace before that
 of Commerce. When you consider what we
 have done, and promis’d to do for her Majesty
 of *Hungary*, you can scarce suppose she would
 refuse us such a Favour, had it been requir’d:
 But she guarantees *Hanover* by the second Article,
 and that satiated all our Wishes.—Poor *Eng-*
land! how abandon’d by every late Set of Mi-
 nisters!—or rather how sacrificed by them all,
 in every Instance, to a petty *foreign Interest*!

I am, &c.

F I N I S.







